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Abstract Since the start of the Arab Spring, the Middle East
has been the scene of conflict that resonates far beyond its
borders. This paper will argue that the upheavals in theMiddle
East cry out for a long view and that scenario development in
theory is well positioned to give it and has an interest in doing
so. However, the paper will also suggest that scenario meth-
odology for informing policy decisions for the contemporary
Middle East is underdeveloped. The paper will outline some
of the methodological challenges. It will also suggest im-
provements and alternative uses for scenarios for the Arab
Spring Middle East.
Keywords Arab Spring .Middle East . Scenario
development . Discontinuity
Introduction
On December 17th, 2010, an exasperated Mohammed
Bouazizi set himself alight in an ultimate act of protest after
a brush with local authorities. In death, the Tunisian street
vendor thumbed his nose at those authoritarian officials who
he felt belittled by over the years. His defiant act triggered a
wave of protest so large that it unseated long time Tunisian
president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali within amonth. The knock-
on effect across the region was both large and unforeseen.
Bouazizi's self-immolation was an unlikely trigger of re-
gional upheaval. Yet 2,5 years after his act sparked the Arab
Spring, the Middle East especially is the scene of conflict that
resonates far beyond its borders, including Europe. Coming
on top of existent tensions, the upheavals have forced the hand
of leaders of various stripes in uncomfortable directions. And
while opinions differ widely and loudly over visions of the
future and the steps needed to achieve them, they are perhaps
united in their uncertainty over the outcome of the upheavals.
This paper first argues that, more than before the Arab
Spring, the disruptions in the Middle East cry out for a long
view. Second, it explains that the upheavals provide an op-
portunity for scenario development to prove its worth by
providing outlooks that inform Western policy decisions.
The third section, however, argues that scenario methodology
is inadequate for informing decision making on the contem-
poraryMiddle Eastern upheavals. The paper will outline some
of the methodological challenges. It will also suggest im-
provements and alternative uses for scenarios for the Arab
Spring Middle East.
Why the Arab Spring Middle East matters
To argue that Middle Eastern developments resonate in the
West is to state the obvious. The extension of Islam and
muslim migration to Europe are commonplace examples of
Middle Eastern influence elsewhere. Similarly obvious is the
large Western stake in the region as exemplified by the United
States’ unwavering commitment to Israel. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to explore the historic relationship between
the West and the Middle East sufficiently to do it justice.
However, it is worth noting aspects of recent history in order
to explore Western interest in the region today.
The interests of Western and some Middle Eastern powers
converged with the 1991 GulfWar, when a broad political and
military coalition was formed to protect oil interests in Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, although the rhetoric at the time trumpeted
a mainly ideological and humanitarian cause. A dynamic mix
of related and sometimes conflicting interests continues to the
present. To illustrate, theWestern, Christian presence on Saudi
Arabia’s holy Islamic soil during the Gulf War stoked anti-
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Western sentiment in the region. The West’s strong political
and military support of such secular authoritarian regimes as
those in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia was in part an effort
to contain the resulting security threat. However, these rela-
tionships became difficult to reconcile with Western demo-
cratic ideals in the face of Arab Spring popular uprisings
against such regimes, the Egyptian revolution being the
starkest example. In short, Western involvement in the Middle
East over the past decades is anchored in economic interest
from which security, political, ideological and humanitarian
interests derive.
The Arab Spring comes on top of such pre-existent West-
ern concerns as the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the
vulnerable post-Iraq war recovery and the brinkmanship over
the Iranian nuclear development programme. Although the
West is not new to explosive situations in the Middle East it
struggles to respond more now than before. Why? Analysis of
international news media points to five distinctive features of
the Arab Spring Middle East that combine to form a more
dangerous and uncertain mix than previously. These features
are the security threats, the role of new media, the humanitar-
ian disaster, the interconnection of the tensions and the speed
of developments on the ground.
The security threats
Perhaps most distinctive of Western concerns over the Arab
Spring Middle East is the heightened security threat resulting
from increased regional instability. To date, three Middle
Eastern regimes have been been toppled (Yemen and two in
Egypt) and two others have seen popular uprisings against
them (Syria and Bahrain). Nearly all other Middle Eastern
countries’ rulers have scrambled to avert similar challenges to
their authority; from the arrest of bloggers in the UAE to the
co-option of potential troublemakers in Jordan. However, with
the Syrian conflict spilling over into neighbouring countries,
further regional instability is conceivable.
Of the resulting security concerns those over Syria are
arguably the most acute. Firstly, the conflict is a jihadi rallying
point, radicalising individuals both inside and outside the
region, including Europe, and luring some to actively take
part in the fighting. Of particular concern is the threat of
jihadis in Syria eventually turning their sights to the West.
Secondly, there is the danger of the large stock of Assad’s
chemical weapons falling into the hands of the West’s
enemies.
Another concern is the sectarian nature of conflicts. The
protests in Bahrain pitted a Sunni ruling minority against a
Shia majority. The Syrian conflict is also strongly sectarian,
with Iran and Hezbollah coming to the aid of a minority Shia
regime while Qatar and Saudi Arabia strongly back the Sunni
opposition. Furthermore, sectarian violence in Iraq has shot up
in 2013 after a gradual decline in recent years. Both Syria and
Iraq are theatres for Shia Iran’s efforts to assert itself against
Sunni enemies. The Sunni-Shia schism is destabilising the
region and it resonates beyond the Middle East, including in
Europe [1].
The ascent of political Islam is also of concern to many,
both in and outside the Middle East. Islamists are generally
mistrustful of the West and some openly hostile to it. Com-
mercial, diplomatic and other relationships might become
complicated as a result; the future of the Israeli-Egyptian
peace treaty being of a particular concern.
The role of new media
Relatively new factors and strongly influential to the Arab
Spring are such new media as twitter, YouTube and satellite
television. The catalytic influence of such new media as
twitter and YouTube have made Western response more
challenging.
The power of newmedia was perhaps first felt in the region
during the 2009 protests in Iran following the controversial re-
election of president Ahmadinejad. The footage of a dying
Neda Agha-Soltan, a young protester shot during a demon-
stration, went viral on the web and television screens globally
and served as a rallying point for further protest.
The power of new media during the Arab Spring became
clear with the Egyptian revolution where social media helped
both to mobilise protest in Cairo streets and to respond to it.
Furthermore, Al Jazeera’s near breathless coverage of the
Egyptian protests carried the voice of many who previously
had none to living rooms and political centres all over the
world. New media has since become a weapon whose effec-
tive use influences not only events on the ground but also
political agendas. At the June 2013 G8-summit, for example,
Russian president Putin scored points against Western rivals
who support the opposition with a reference to YouTube
footage of an Islamist fighter, Abu Sakkar, biting the heart
of a dead soldier.
The new media’s influence is arguably strongest in putting
a human face on the Arab Spring. News channels’ near daily
images of such places as Tahrir Square and Zataari refugee
camp bring the upheavals to life in an unprecedented manner.
Images of such atrocities as those in Syrian towns of Hula and
Banias brought outrage, forcing governments to address the
conflict where they might otherwise prefer to look away.
Unfortunately, the new media have no shortage of material,
given the unprecedented magnitude of the humanitarian
plight.
The humanitarian disaster
The Arab Spring’s human toll, particularly in Syria, is perhaps
the strongest illustration of the scale of the upheaval. The
official UN death toll in the Syrian conflict presently stands
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at over 100,000. The number is less than the 120,000 in Iraq
since the US-led invasion in 2003 [2], but the Syrian deaths
occurred in just over 2 years time. With no end to the fighting
in sight, it is reasonable to assume that the final death toll will
be considerably higher.
Furthermore, of the more than 45.2 million displaced per-
sons worldwide at the end of 2012, nearly 6.5 million were
located in North Africa and the Middle East [3]. On July 16th,
2013, the United Nations announced that the Syrian conflict
has caused the world’s worst refugee crisis for 20 years [4]. It
stated that 5,000 Syrians are killed each month and that 6.8
million people need urgent help. The UN has 1.8 million
registered Syrian refugees of which two thirds have fled the
country in 2013 at an average rate of 6,000 people every day.
The sheer numbers have a destabilising effect on
neighbouring Jordan and Lebanon, who already host large
communities of Iraqi (Jordan) and Palestinian refugees. Tur-
key, the bridge to Europe, hosts around 400 000 Syrian
refugees.
The interconnection of the problem
Tensions of all sorts converge in Arab Spring Middle East:
Sunni versus Shia, religion versus secularism, autocracy ver-
sus democracy, progressive versus conservative, East versus
West. These combine to form an intricate mesh of dynamic
forces and allegiances. A letter to the editor of a Gulf states
newspaper provides an apt illustration of the complex nature
of the interconnections [5].
Sir, Iran is backing Assad. Gulf states are against Assad!
Assad is against Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim Brother-
hood and Obama are against General Sisi [head of the
Egyptian military]. But Gulf states are pro-Sisi! Which
means that they are against Muslim Brotherhood! Iran is
pro-Hamas, but Hamas is against the US! Gulf States are
pro-US. But Turkey is with Gulf states against Assad;
yet Turkey is pro-Muslim Brotherhood against General
Sisi. And General Sisi is being backed by the Gulf
States!Welcome to the Middle East and have a nice day.
The letter describes the interconnection on a state actor
level. There are many other patchworks of influential factors;
from youth unemployment to tribal allegiance, water re-
sources to Islamic schools of law. Developments in one area
might have any number of knock-on effects in others. More-
over, Bouazizi’s self-immolation shows that a spark in one
corner of the region can have a multiplier effect, igniting a
cascade of disruptions in other parts of the Middle East.
Breaking issues down into manageable parts risks an over-
simplification of the problem. The Middle Eastern mesh of
interconnecting forces is difficult to fathom at the best of
times. It is nearly impossible with the disruptions of the Arab
Spring.
The speed of developments on the ground
A last factor particular to the Arab Spring upheavals is the
pace at which they occur. In 2,5 years time large parts of the
Middle East have seen upheaval. New media are accelerators
of the change. They gather news on the ground and send it
faster and further than before, inviting quicker response. The
mechanism applies in various contexts; from skirmishes in
Cairo streets to diplomatic negotiations in the UN Security
Council. The pace is difficult to keep up with, let alone to stay
ahead of, for decision-makers in Western capitals. And it
allows little room for thorough analysis before taking deci-
sions. Illustrative is Obama’s unsure and hesitant response to
the Egyptian revolution and the Syrian conflict.
An opportunity for scenario development
With such a multi-faceted situation crying out for a resolution,
is there a role for scenario development for informing policy
on the Arab Spring Middle East?
This paper works from the premise that futures research
aims to explain complex problems in order to explore their
possible development and inform relevant policy. Such com-
plex problems are sometimes described as “messy” [6],
“wicked” [7, 8] and “persistent” [9]. They are characterised
by their unstructured, unsolvable nature; containment or man-
agement of the problem is the best achievable outcome.Messy
problems involve divergent, at times conflicting, interests and
perspectives and their urgency prevents comprehensive anal-
ysis. Lastly, messy problems involve a tangled web of dispa-
rate, interconnected issues: political, social, economic, tech-
nological and so on.
The situation in the Middle East is certainly complex when
judged by these standards. The notion that urgency prevents
comprehensive analysis is demonstrated in the West’s dilem-
ma over engagement in Syria. Should the West intervene
militarily to stop the bloodshed? Or might such action backfire
by strengthening a future Syrian jihadi threat to the West?
Better perhaps to err on the side of caution? Or might that lead
to increased Iranian influence in the region and thus under-
mine Western efforts to curb its nuclear aspirations? The
unintended consequences of intervention are potentially enor-
mous yet Western decision-makers arguably cannot afford the
luxury of waiting, for fear of worsening the conflict.
An illustration of the unsolvable nature of current Middle
Eastern conflicts is the Shia-Sunni divide, which is based on
opposing views about the prophet Muhammad’s succession.
Centuries of disagreement, sometimes violent, has led to
further entrenchment of positions. Perhaps the epitomy of
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the conflicting interests in the region is the dispute between
Jews and Palestinians over the same land, often at each others’
expense. The failure of 1993 Oslo Accords to resolve the
dispute arguably demonstrates that containment of the prob-
lem is the best achievable outcome for the foreseeable future.
The Arab Spring Middle East has added new competing
visions of desired futures to the mix. Illustrative are the visions
of Syria held by the Assad-regime, the jihadist Jabhat al-Nusra
and such activist European states as France and Britain, which
range from a caliphate to the restoration of the old order. The
many competing visions of desired futures at best only par-
tially reflect present reality. Given the West’s uncertain re-
sponse to the Middle Eastern upheavals, these visions appear
to offer insufficient guidance for decision-makers in Western
capitals in informing their decisions. These decision-makers
might be well served by outlooks that capture a range of
possible paths to the future in such a well-reasoned manner
that they inform policy. The complexity of Middle Eastern
problems and futures research’s theoretical basis for tackling
complex issues suggests that it might contribute to developing
outlooks for the region. The humanitarian disaster surely
reinforces the argument that a contribution should be made
if possible.
Of the futures research approaches, scenario development
is one that might provide a long view since it aims to make
sense of messy problems and to explore their future develop-
ment. Scenario methods’ holistic approach and their combi-
nation of analytical knowledge and creative thinking could
bring a wide range of possible futures together to form man-
ageable outlooks that inform Western decision-making on the
Middle East. Moreover, in theory, scenario development “em-
brace[s] the potential for sharp discontinuities” [10] such as
those that occur in the region. Indeed, the scenario community
has an interest in addressing the Arab Spring Middle East to
offset an over-reliance on last century’s best practices as
described by Schwartz [11] and Van der Heijden [12] among
others. In theory, therefore, scenario development can and
should provide a long view for the Middle East. Is current
scenario methodology up to the task?
Methodological hurdles
The complex nature of the Arab Spring Middle East brings
certain problems with scenario methodology to the fore. First,
scenario development does not explore discontinuity as a
matter of course. Second, tension exists within criteria that
scenarios must meet to be considered legitimate. Third, the
causal reasoning that underpins scenarios cannot sufficiently
capture the range of possible future developments. Lastly,
there is the challenge of keeping pace with the events on the
ground in order to remain relevant.
First, despite the claim that scenario development embraces
the notion of discontinuity, research shows that scenarios tend
not to stray beyond the beaten path [13]. Discontinuity is
difficult to accommodate in scenarios as it requires addressing
uncertain and unknowable future issues in present-day frames
of reference. Furthermore, the same research shows that ‘dis-
continuity-rich’ scenarios are usually products of intuitive, free-
thinking processes where happy circumstance prompts the
consideration of upheavals, rather than any discontinuity-
oriented methodology. Therefore, it is debateable whether sce-
nario development in itself can adequately explore events and
processes as disruptive as those in the Middle East since 2010.
Second, should scenario methodology become more
discontinuity-oriented, then certain acknowledged quality
standards for scenarios would need to be revised. These
include such criteria as internal coherence, consistency, and
plausibility [13]. A first problem with the criteria: if the
premise is true that scenarios are hypothetical and not predic-
tive, then plausibility surely cannot be expected of them, as
they then require premature judgements on the probability of
future developments. Furthermore, there is a tension between
these criteria and the notion that scenarios stretch the imagi-
nation and stimulate ‘thinking the unthinkable’. Events some-
times defy explanation in the present and only become coher-
ent, consistent, and plausible in hindsight. Applying the
criteria prospectively narrows the spectrum of future possibil-
ities whereby shutting out the unexpected. How would
Bouazizi’s self-immolation as a trigger for regional upheaval
have been judged by these criteria on the eve of the Arab
Spring? Probably not very highly. Besides, whether an idea is
consistent, coherent or plausible is often subject to interpreta-
tion. Thus coherence, consistency, and plausibility are prob-
lematic as quality standards for scenarios.
A third handicap is the restrictive nature of the causal
reasoning that underlies scenarios. Cause and effect relation-
ships between relevant actors and issues are the cement of
scenarios and other futures methodology such as systems
analysis and computational models. The afore-named quality
standards all reflect the basic requirement that alternative
paths to the future are constructed around these relationships.
However, the dynamic mesh of causal relationships in the
Middle East is arguably too complex to capture in scenarios.
Computational models might handle the large number of
interactions but such important Middle Eastern issues as reli-
gion and ideology are not easily quantified. Participatory
scenario processes suffer from the reverse since they are able
to tackle qualitative issues yet they lack the capacity for
rigorous analysis of large numbers of interactions.
Lastly, the time span of a scenario process for the future of
the Middle East is also problematic. Scenario development
generally requires a large investment in time and expertise.
Consequently, it is usually not a continual process that runs
simultaneously to the developments within the subject of
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study. At best, scenarios, once completed, are periodically
revised. However, with the Middle East in such flux it is
questionable whether scenarios can contribute sufficiently to
be meaningful and be timely enough to inform policy deci-
sions, especially given the quality real-time commentary on
the Middle East that already exists.
What use for scenarios?
The methodological hurdles limit the scope for scenario de-
velopment to inform policy on the Arab Spring Middle East.
To become more policy-relevant the notion of discontinuity
needs to be embedded in scenario methodology on various
levels; epistemological, analytical, contextual, and procedural
[13]. On an epistemological level, discontinuity needs to be
embraced rather than treated as a novelty or freak accident. On
the analytical level, the ambiguous and intangible nature of
discontinuity should invite exploration of its various guises
rather than being a source of discomfort. On a contextual
level, cultures of curiosity to explore discontinuity should be
established that are free of political and institutional con-
straints, yet in close contact with the policy arena. Lastly, on
a procedural level, such approaches as chance discovery [14],
historical analogy [13], and perspective-based imaging [13]
might be used more frequently. Such improvements to sce-
nario methodology are not a tall order. To illustrate, experi-
ments with historical analogy and perspective-based imaging
demonstrate that there is promise in these methods [13].
Historical analogy involves the analysis of past situations in
the study of the present [15] and helps to inspire thinking about
future cases through creative discussions about the future. To
illustrate, in an experiment with historical analogy in 2004 par-
allels were drawn between the 1995 Brent Spar affair and pos-
sible disruptions in the then-nascent aquaculture industry [13].
With regards to the contemporary Middle East, an analogy with
the 1978 Camp David Accords [16] might help decision-makers
in the event of Syria’s fragmentation into several separate entities,
for example. In 1978, the Sinai desert, originally part of Egypt,
had been under Israeli control since its capture in the 1967 6 Day
War. At CampDavid, Egyptian and Israeli positions on the future
of the Sinai proved incompatible. Israeli security concerns
demanded that part of the Sinai remained under Israel’s control
whereas Egyptian sovereignty claims required the return of the
whole territory. A solution was found when Egypt and Israel
agreed to a plan that would return the Sinai to complete Egyptian
sovereignty and still meet Israeli security concerns by
demilitarizing large areas of the peninsula.
Imaging involves the positing of an unlikely event
underpinned by a chronology of developments that precede
it [17]. The theoretical basis of perspective-based analysis lies
in the idea that such factors as norms, values, and experiences
influence individuals’ views of the world. Perspective-based
analysis has been applied in investigations of uncertainty and
risk using scenario development [7]. The afore-mentioned
2004 experiment combined imaging and perspective-based
analysis and demonstrated its promise for the exploration of
potential discontinuity [13]. In the experiment perspectives on
the Chernobyl disaster and various food scares were among
the cases used to explore possible future disruptions. How a
shift in perspectives might provide insights for policy in a
Middle Eastern context is illustrated by a 1970 interview with
the then Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser [16]. In
response to the question what he wanted from his nemesis,
Israeli prime minister Golda Meir, Nasser said that she should
withdraw from all territory that Israel had captured from Arab
forces during the 1967 6 DayWar. When Nasser stated that he
was not prepared to offer Meir anything in return, the inter-
viewer asked him what would happen to the Israeli prime
minister if she were to concede to his position. “Oh, would
she have trouble at home,” was Nasser’s response. It is sug-
gested that this insight led to a more conciliatory attitude on
Nasser’s part to negotiating with Israel.
Pending methodological innovation for informing policy,
how might scenarios otherwise contribute to a long view for
the Middle East? First, tactical scenarios might be developed
as used in a military context where so-called war games offer
the possibility of simulating potential situations and war
rooms offer experts and decision-makers the opportunity to
anticipate and respond real time to developments on the
ground. These scenarios have a limited scope and can provide
timely insights on short-term outcomes of a specific action.
They thus offer the possibility for changing tactics as the
scenario enfolds. For example, such tactical scenarios might
explore possible responses to the kidnap of OPCW weapons
inspectors by Syrian opposition forces. Furthermore, it is
conceivable that the Obama administration ran through such
scenarios with its decision to announce a military response to
the chemical attacks on Ghouta, a Damascus suburb, on
August 21st, 2013 (though its muddled behaviour afterwards
suggests otherwise).
Second, scenario development might also contribute as
educational and awareness-raising aids for students and ob-
servers of the Middle East. Time is less of a constraint when
used for educational purposes and it allows for a more open
exploration of issues than with the more narrow goal of
informing to policy decisions. Furthermore, a more thorough
investigation is possible and participatory methods such as
stakeholder-workshops, focus groups and policy exercises
might be part of such a scenario process [7].
Conclusion
The upheavals in the Middle East cry out for a long
view yet scenario methodology appears limited in what
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it can offer Western decision-makers. Tactical and edu-
cational scenarios are feasible but a meaningful policy
informing role is hampered by a several methodological
problems. In order to become more policy relevant,
methodological innovation is particularly needed in the
integration of the notion of discontinuity in scenario
development. Previous experiments have provided en-
couraging results. The Middle East is likely to remain
in flux for some time. There is still ample opportunity
for a contribution from the scenario community to a
Middle Eastern future after the Arab Spring.
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